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UNLOCKING ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DISABLED 
STUDENTS IN PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
Campbell Sode 
ABSTRACT—Many disabled students exercise their First Amendment right 
to choose to attend a private religious school only to learn that the school 
will not provide reasonable accommodations crucial to their academic 
success. Because private religious schools are exempt from Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate, 
disabled students that choose such schools may be forced to find a more 
welcoming learning environment elsewhere. As a result, disabled students 
are currently unable to enjoy their Free Exercise Clause right to choose to 
enroll in their ideal private religious schools to the same extent as their 
nonhandicapped peers. 
This inequality can be reduced by an expansive application of the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is known as the Rehab Act and 
covers entities that receive federal financial assistance. The Rehab Act is a 
key statute for disabled students in private religious schools since there is no 
religious exemption from its requirement that reasonable accommodations 
be made for the disabled. However, the Rehab Act will achieve maximum 
potency only if private religious schools that hold tax-exempt status, or 
indirectly benefit from federal programs via a parent entity, are classified as 
recipients of federal financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes. Also, a 
Rehab Act regulation that allows private religious schools to charge disabled 
students for reasonable accommodations should be limited so cost-shifting 
is only possible if the school genuinely cannot afford the accommodations at 
issue. And this approach to the problems disabled students face at private 
religious schools would not infringe upon these schools’ First Amendment 
right to the free exercise of religion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private religious schools are a popular educational option in the United 
States. 1  In 2015, almost four million Americans attended over 23,000 
religious elementary or secondary schools,2 while approximately two million 
students were enrolled in 883 religious colleges.3 Parents and children select 
religious schools for many reasons, 4  and the right to choose a religious 
education is protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.5 
But the unwillingness of some private religious schools to provide 
reasonable accommodations deprives disabled students of opportunities to 
attend such schools.6 Lobbying efforts by religious groups ensured that the 
 
 1  See STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, ADAM RETTIG & JENNIFER PETERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2015–16 PRIVATE 
SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017073.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PAJ7-9YA9] (reporting that sixty-seven percent of private schools had a “religious orientation or 
purpose”). 
 2 Id. at 6 tbl.1, 7 tbl.2 (showing that of the 4.9 million students who attended private schools in 2015, 
1.07 million attended 11,304 nonsectarian schools, while 3.83 million attended 23,272 religious schools). 
 3 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TABLE 
303.90 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.90.asp [https://perma.cc/Z9M5-
W8Y4]. 
 4 These reasons may be academic, financial, social, or religious. See Five Reasons Why Parents 
Choose a Catholic School Education, MONTEREY BAY PARENT, https://www.montereybayparent.com/
articles/education/five-reasons-why-parents-choose-a-catholic-school-education 
[https://perma.cc/2ZDM-RR5H]. 
 5 Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 49 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]here is no question that the Free 
Exercise Clause ensures that . . . all Americans[] are free to opt for a religious education for their children 
if they wish.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (restricting Congress from making any law prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion). 
 6 See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., No. Civ.A.04-4647, 2005 WL 289929, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded, 480 F.3d 252, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2007) (indicating that a 
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reasonable accommodation requirement incorporated into Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)7 does not apply to private religious 
schools.8 As such, some disabled students are forced to find more welcoming 
educational settings elsewhere. 9  It is ironic that certain private religious 
schools—themselves protected under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause—effectively deprive disabled students of their First Amendment 
right to choose a religious education. 
Two examples illustrate the ongoing issue of some private religious 
schools’ refusal to make reasonable accommodations for disabled students.10 
First, in 2005, a former student sued the Abington Friends School, a private 
Quaker school located in suburban Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for failing to 
reasonably accommodate his attention-deficit disorder and other learning 
disabilities.11 The student also contended that Abington Friends School staff 
engaged in disability discrimination in the form of physical discipline, public 
humiliation, and an orchestrated campaign to force him to withdraw from the 
school.12 The Third Circuit remanded the case to allow the student to conduct 
discovery to support his claim.13 Second, in 2013, Michael Argenyi, a deaf 
medical student, sued Creighton University, a private Jesuit school in 
Omaha, Nebraska, when it refused to provide reasonable accommodations in 
the form of cued speech interpreters and real-time captioning of lectures—
otherwise known as communication access real-time translation (CART).14 
Creighton’s resistance forced Argenyi to take out about $114,000 in personal 
loans over two years to pay for the interpreting and CART services that he 
 
private Quaker school’s refusal to accommodate a student’s disabilities contributed to the student leaving 
the school); accord Della Hasselle, Family Sues New Orleans Catholic Schools, Says Child with 
Disability Denied Entry, NOLA.COM (Dec. 5, 2020, 3:02 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/coronavirus/
article_e74b6ec0-2f59-11eb-a9a2-77043325dbfa.html [https://perma.cc/6HPK-SGKB] (alleging that 
two private Roman Catholic schools in New Orleans, Louisiana discriminated against a wheelchair-bound 
student with cerebral palsy by refusing to allow her aide to accompany her during the school day); Tamara 
Le, My Turn: Fighting ‘Ableism’ in Private and Religious Schools, CONCORD MONITOR (Dec. 1, 2019, 
6:15 AM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Ableism-30839392 [https://perma.cc/M8J2-DYBL] 
(“Currently over 90% of New Hampshire’s K-12 private and religious schools lack an anti-discrimination 
provision in their institution’s admission policy for students who experience a disability. Any disability. 
Physical, medical, genetic, emotional, learning. Over 90%.”). 
 7 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 
 8 See Shannon Dingle, Resisting Ableism in the American Church, SOJOURNERS (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://sojo.net/articles/resisting-ableism-american-church [https://perma.cc/6GNP-UDJ5]. 
 9 See supra note 6. 
 10 See, e.g., Hasselle, supra note 6 (discussing a student’s lawsuit against two private schools in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, which alleged that the schools refused to reasonably accommodate her cerebral palsy 
and need for a wheelchair). 
 11 Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d at 253–54. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 259. 
 14 Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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needed.15 The court concluded that there was “a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Creighton denied Argenyi an equal opportunity to gain the 
same benefit from medical school as his nondisabled peers by refusing to 
provide his requested accommodations.”16 
This Essay addresses the fact that disabled students cannot always enjoy 
their First Amendment right to choose a religious education to the same 
extent as their nonhandicapped peers and argues that federal law may oblige 
such schools to provide reasonable accommodations. Part I sets out the 
legislation relevant to this issue. Part II explains that if a private religious 
school does not accommodate a disabled student, courts must first ask 
whether the school is truly religious. This is a crucial threshold question 
because if it is answered in the negative, the offending private school is a 
secular entity and thus subject to Title III of the ADA.17 Part III lays out a 
possible legal solution for cases where a bona fide private religious school 
refuses to accommodate its disabled students. Although the ADA and 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)18 are ineffective in such 
situations,19 an expansive application of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act 
(Rehab Act)20 may be the best means of helping disabled students obtain 
reasonable accommodations while attending private religious schools as they 
progress from prekindergarten classrooms to higher education settings. Part 
IV concludes by proposing a series of amendments to the ADA and Rehab 
Act that would help protect disabled students’ access to private religious 
schools by solidifying and filling the current gaps in these disability-focused 
civil rights laws. 
 
 15 Id. at 445. It is unclear why Creighton did not raise the religious exception to Title III of the ADA 
in this case, which may have been dispositive given Creighton’s Jesuit character. The Jesuits, also called 
the Society of Jesus, are a Catholic religious order that operates private religious schools, which adhere 
to a fixed set of religious and moral values, around the world. See What Is a Jesuit Education?, 
CREIGHTON UNIV., https://www.creighton.edu/about/what-jesuit-education [https://perma.cc/K9T7-
RJTF]. 
 16 Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 451. 
 17 See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 153 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Baldwin 
School is a private college preparatory school. Like other private schools, it is covered by Title III of the 
ADA . . . .”); DOJ, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § III-1.5000, https://www.ada.gov/
taman3.html [https://perma.cc/982E-ZZ4F] (confining exceptions from Title III of the ADA to religious 
entities). 
 18 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. 
 19 As mentioned earlier in this Essay, the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement does not 
apply to private religious schools. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187. In addition, IDEA is implemented by public 
school districts, which are not always required to ensure the availability of reasonable accommodations 
at private religious schools. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). 
 20 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b. 
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I. RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
Three federal statutes—Title III of the ADA, the Rehab Act, and 
IDEA—apply to students with disabilities. 21  Although there are crucial 
differences between ADA’s Title III and the Rehab Act, the statutes impose 
identical substantive duties. 22  Both statutes require schools—preschools 
through colleges—to offer reasonable accommodations if a student has a 
known disability. 23  Effectiveness is the hallmark of reasonable 
accommodations. 24  Accommodations do not need to be perfect or fit a 
student’s preferences, but they must be effective25  in the sense that they 
accommodate the limitations generally associated with a given disability.26 
The reasonableness of an accommodation is a fact-sensitive issue analyzed 
on a case-by-case basis. 27  IDEA, on the other hand, serves a different 
purpose, as it ensures all disabled students have access to a free appropriate 
public education in elementary and secondary school.28 School districts in 
which disabled students reside must implement IDEA, and this obligation 
persists even if a student opts to enroll in a private school.29 
II. IS IT ACTUALLY A RELIGIOUS SCHOOL? 
In cases where disabled students sue their private religious schools for 
not implementing reasonable accommodations, the schools tend to highlight 
 
 21 For a discussion of laws applicable to disabled students, see A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and 
Section 504, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CTR., https://schoolnursing101.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/A-
COMPARISON-of-ADA-IDEA-504.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D8Q-XKQC]. 
 22 Berardelli ex rel. M.B. v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 114–17 (3d Cir. 2018). 
As explained below, there are two key differences between Title III of the ADA and the Rehab Act. First, 
private religious schools are not exempt from the Rehab Act, while they are exempt from Title III of the 
ADA. Second, unlike Title III of the ADA, the Rehab Act is only applicable to entities that participate in 
a program or activity that receives federal funds; this definition covers some private religious schools, 
thus obligating them to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students. Infra Part II, Section 
III.B. 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 24 Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002)) (explaining that “[a]n ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will 
not accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations,” and “the law requires an effective accommodation, 
not the one that is most effective for each employee”). 
 27 Dean, 804 F.3d at 189. 
 28  J.T. v. District of Columbia, 496 F. Supp. 3d 190, 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A)). 
 29 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3–4, 13–14 (1993) (holding that the 
Establishment Clause does not bar private religious schools from providing publicly funded 
accommodations because IDEA “creates a neutral government program dispensing aid . . . to individual 
handicapped children”); Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist. v. Lua ex rel. K.L., 832 F. App’x 493, 495–96 (9th 
Cir. 2020). 
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their religious character and seek dismissal or summary judgment on grounds 
that Title III of the ADA does not apply to them.30 Some private religious 
schools have in fact avoided reasonably accommodating disabled students 
by arguing that the schools are religious in nature. 31  However, before 
granting such requests, courts should, as a preliminary matter, ask if the 
school is really religious in nature. 32  If the school is truly religious in 
character, Title III of the ADA is immaterial, and the school has “no 
obligations under the ADA.”33 If not, the school is a secular institution that 
must reasonably accommodate its disabled students under Title III of the 
ADA.34 
To this point, “religious schools” must be defined for ADA purposes. 
Title III of the ADA exempts “religious organizations or entities controlled 
by religious organizations.”35 But neither of these terms are defined,36 and 
the relevant ADA regulations simply say this exception is “very broad, 
encompassing a wide variety of situations.”37 For these reasons, one cannot 
identify what exactly constitutes a religious school solely by parsing the 
ADA and its regulations. 
But federal courts have offered some guidance on this issue. Although 
all religious and secular characteristics are relevant to whether an entity is 
 
 30  See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that a private religious school’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit by a disabled student was based 
on its religious nature and association with the Quakers); Sky R. ex rel. Angela R. v. Haddonfield Friends 
Sch., No. 14-5730, 2016 WL 1260061, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2016) (highlighting that a private Quaker 
school moved for summary judgment in a case involving a disabled student on the grounds that it was 
exempt from the ADA); Spann ex rel. Hopkins v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr. Church, 589 F. Supp. 2d 
759, 762–63 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is 
exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a religious private school that is controlled by a 
religious organization, Word of Faith Christian Center Church.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Sky R., 2016 WL 1260061, at *7 (“As a private school with a religious affiliation with 
the Religious Society of Friends (‘Quakers’) and under the control of the Haddonfield Monthly Meeting 
(‘HMM’), [Haddonfield Friends School] is excluded from the ADA . . . .”). 
 32 See Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d at 258 (“Whether Abington [Friends School] qualifies for the 
ADA’s religious exemption is a mixed question of law and fact, the answer to which depends, of course, 
on the existence of a record sufficient to decide it.”). 
 33 White v. Denver Seminary, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (D. Colo. 2001). 
 34 See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 153 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Baldwin 
School is a private college preparatory school. Like other private schools, it is covered by Title III of the 
ADA . . . .”). 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 12187. 
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181. 
 37 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. C § 36.104 (2020); see, e.g., Rose v. Cahee, 727 F. Supp. 2d 728, 748 (E.D. 
Wis. 2010) (construing the ADA’s religious organization exception as including a Catholic healthcare 
system). 
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primarily religious,38 key factors include the school’s “(1) ownership and 
affiliation, (2) purpose, (3) faculty, (4) student body, (5) student activities, 
and (6) curriculum.”39 Judges may also ask whether the school is a nonprofit 
and has a formal religious presence within its management ranks or on its 
board of trustees.40 
The Ninth Circuit applied this test to the Kamehameha Schools, a group 
of private schools in Hawai’i.41 Although the Kamehameha Schools held 
themselves out as Protestant, the court found that they were secular and 
therefore could not benefit from religious exemptions set out in federal law.42 
Here, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Kamehameha Schools: (1) were wholly 
owned by the secular Bishop Trust; (2) had gradually shifted from a religious 
purpose to a focus on secular principles; (3) enforced a Protestant-only rule 
for on-campus teachers but did not require church membership or scrutinize 
their religious beliefs, and of the 250 full-time faculty, only three had specific 
religious teaching duties; (4) did not consider the religious affiliation of their 
pupils, so only one-third of their 3,000 on-campus students were Protestant; 
(5) sponsored many student activities, only some of which had mild religious 
aspects; and (6) offered a largely secular curriculum that did not instruct their 
students in Protestant doctrine and only contained a limited comparative 
religious education requirement.43 The Ninth Circuit found that “[i]n sum, 
the religious characteristics of the Schools consist of minimal, largely 
comparative religious studies, scheduled prayers and services, quotation of 
Bible verses in a school publication, and the employment of nominally 
Protestant teachers for secular subjects.”44 This was insufficient to establish 
a religious nature—the Ninth Circuit instead ruled that the Kamehameha 
Schools were a “secular institution operating within an historical tradition 
that includes Protestantism, and that the Schools’ purpose and character is 
primarily secular, not religious.”45 
This multifactor test can thus help ensure that private religious school 
defendants in “failure-to-accommodate” lawsuits are genuinely entitled to 
 
 38 EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988) (illustrating that courts 
use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether an entity is genuinely religious and can thus 
benefit from religious exemptions). 
 39 Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) 
(citing EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Est., 990 F.2d 458, 461–63 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 40 LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007); Kamehameha, 
990 F.2d at 461; Townley, 859 F.2d at 618–19; EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 487 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 41 Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 461–64. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 463. 
 45 Id. at 463–64. 
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the religious exemption enumerated in Title III of the ADA. A less exacting 
approach may give private schools that do not want to deal with perceived 
hassles associated with disabled students a “get-out-of-jail-free” card: Assert 
a religious purpose to avoid enrolling disabled students who initially appear 
difficult to integrate into the student body. 
III. RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND DISABLED STUDENTS 
As noted above, Title III of the ADA is ineffective because a private 
school that is truly religious in character is exempt from the requirement to 
reasonably accommodate a disabled student. But disabled students can use 
two other federal statutes to access the needed reasonable accommodations 
while attending such schools. This Part addresses these alternative federal 
statutes in four Sections. Section A argues that, although disabled K–12 
students enrolled in private religious schools may be able to obtain services 
from their local school district through IDEA, that statute is fraught with 
shortcomings. Section B asserts that disabled students may instead be able 
to secure reasonable accommodations through the Rehab Act, which applies 
to all private schools that receive federal financial assistance.46 Because the 
Rehab Act is broader than IDEA, an expansive application of the Rehab Act 
could better help disabled students exercise their First Amendment right to 
choose a religious education to the same extent as their nonhandicapped 
peers. Section C highlights several First Amendment justifications for such 
an application of the Rehab Act. Finally, Section D explores some policy 
considerations which are relevant to disabled students’ access to reasonable 
accommodations at private religious schools. 
A. IDEA Is Ineffective in Its Current Form 
IDEA guarantees all disabled elementary- and secondary-school 
students access to a “free appropriate public education.”47 While IDEA can 
be helpful, its scope is narrow. First, “IDEA is limited to educational 
opportunities only through the academic level associated with completion of 
secondary school.”48 As a result, IDEA is inapplicable to disabled college 
and graduate students in its current form. 
Second, IDEA allows public school districts to place disabled students 
in private schools, which may occur when the school district feels that, for 
some reason, the private school is better equipped to serve the student’s 
 
 46 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.39(a), 104.41 (2020). 
 47  Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A)). 
 48 K.L. ex rel. L.L. v. R.I. Bd. of Educ., 907 F.3d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 2018). 
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disability-related needs.49 But in such scenarios, the school district need only 
make sure that its disabled students get “some educational benefit, meaning 
a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial, from special instruction and 
services.”50 For example, in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme 
Court held that IDEA did not require a school district to provide a deaf 
student a sign language interpreter because she was able to learn and perform 
at an “adequate” academic level without an interpreter.51 When a school 
district places a disabled student into a private religious school, IDEA 
promises only basic opportunities, not necessarily the services that would 
fully unlock that student’s academic potential.52 
Third, school districts that offer a free, appropriate public education 
have no obligation to serve disabled students who independently decide to 
enroll in a private religious school.53 Thus, only a narrow subset of students 
with disabilities are protected under IDEA. Specifically, it is only when a 
public school district itself places a student in a private religious school that 
IDEA is applicable. Even then, students must settle for merely “adequate” 
educational support. All other disabled students who are denied reasonable 
accommodations by a private religious school must rely on different statutes 
in order to access reasonable accommodations. 
B. The Rehab Act May Be a Better Alternative 
Although Title III of the ADA and IDEA are generally unhelpful to 
disabled students deprived of reasonable accommodations while attending 
private religious schools, the Rehab Act is a promising alternative. Section 
504 of the Rehab Act forbids discrimination against disabled individuals by 
participants in “any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”54 The Rehab Act lacks a religious exemption, so it covers all 
 
 49 See J.T. v. District of Columbia, 496 F. Supp. 3d 190, 200 (D.D.C. 2020); accord Ojai Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1473–78 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for a school 
district in an IDEA case because a state hearing officer correctly concluded that the school district could 
not provide a severely developmentally disabled student with a free appropriate public education as 
evidenced by his inability to communicate in any language whatsoever and lack of self-help skills). The 
court also ruled that the school district had to place the student in a specific private school recommended 
by the hearing officer as especially well-positioned to meet the student’s needs. Id. 
 50 M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 495 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 51 458 U.S. 176, 209–10 (1982). 
 52 In contrast, nondisabled students can easily access services needed to maximize their academic 
potential, such as after-school tutoring sessions with their teachers—they need only ask, and they receive. 
This point illustrates that formal educational policy strongly disfavors disabled students relative to their 
nondisabled peers, and IDEA jurisprudence is such that schools and courts settle for adequate academic 
achievement in the name of an “appropriate” education. See id. 
 53 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). 
 54 Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
180 
private sectarian schools that benefit from direct or indirect federal financial 
assistance.55 
Federal financial assistance consists of direct subsidies and indirect 
support received via intermediaries.56 Indirect federal financial assistance 
includes, among other things, childcare grants,57 free or reduced-cost school 
lunches,58 and college tuition payments subsidized by federal student loans.59 
Although there are some practical differences between direct and indirect 
federal financial assistance,60 they are the same in the eyes of the law.61 As a 
result, the type of federal financial assistance an entity receives has no impact 
on its substantive obligations pursuant to the Rehab Act.62 The Rehab Act’s 
applicability to religious entities, combined with the fact that “federal 
financial assistance” includes both direct and indirect government aid, can 
increase the availability of reasonable accommodations at private religious 
schools under the Act. This will help disabled students enjoy their First 
Amendment right to choose religious schooling. 
The Rehab Act also provides concrete rights and remedies for disabled 
students. Under the Rehab Act, a student can set out a prima facie failure-to-
accommodate claim against a private religious school by stating that (1) the 
student was disabled; (2) the school had notice of the student’s disability; 
and (3) the school denied or ignored requests for reasonable 
accommodations. 63  Furthermore, under the Rehab Act, private religious 
schools cannot charge their disabled students for reasonable 
accommodations unless these modifications cause a “substantial increase in 
cost” for the school.64 
But three things must happen for the Rehab Act to attain maximum 
potency when applied to private religious schools. First, the scope of federal 
 
 55  John A. Liekweg, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504, and Church-Related 
Institutions, 38 CATH. LAW. 87, 95–104 (1998); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.39(a), 104.41 (2020) 
(describing the entities to which the Rehab Act applies). 
 56 U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986). 
 57 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666–67 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 58 See Liekweg, supra note 55, at 97. 
 59 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 558, 563 (1984). 
 60  Practically speaking, direct federal financial assistance consists of funds that flow from the 
government straight to recipients. In contrast, indirect federal financial assistance consists of funds that 
the federal government provides to a recipient through an intermediary. See id. at 564–65. 
 61 Id. at 564. 
 62 Id.; accord Bentley v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 41 F.3d 600, 604 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986)) (explaining that 
Rehab Act “coverage extends to Congress’ intended recipient [of federal financial assistance], whether 
receiving the aid directly or indirectly”). 
 63 Chenari v. George Washington Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 746–47 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 64 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020). 
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financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes should be expanded to include 
federal tax exemptions available to religious groups. Second, if one or more 
of a private religious school’s parent entities benefits from federal financial 
assistance, that support should be imputed to the school in Rehab Act 
contexts. Third, in deciding if a “substantial increase in cost” exists by virtue 
of reasonable accommodations, courts should confirm a private religious 
school’s inability to pay for such modifications before allowing the school 
to seek reimbursement from disabled students. 
1. Tax-Exempt Status as Federal Financial Assistance 
Students who bring Rehab Act failure-to-accommodate claims against 
private religious schools should first identify whether the school participates 
in any federal programs that provide financial assistance, perhaps by filing a 
Freedom of Information Act request with the Department of Education. 65 
The Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate apply when a 
private religious school accepts childcare grants, offers free or reduced-cost 
lunches, or receives tuition payments subsidized by federal student loans.66 
But private religious schools may forgo participation in such programs to 
avoid unwelcome federal oversight.67 
Nevertheless, tax-exempt status means that, for Rehab Act purposes, a 
private religious school itself participates in a “program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.” An entity is eligible to receive federal tax 
exemptions only if it undertakes specific charitable activities that serve a 
valuable public purpose.68 Such a “tax exemption has much the same effect 
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay 
on its income.”69 Supreme Court dicta signal that if these schools hold tax-
exempt status, they receive federal financial assistance and must reasonably 
accommodate disabled students under the Rehab Act.70 For example, Justice 
Clarence Thomas echoed this principle in a case that involved tax-exempt 
religious entities. He emphasized that as “tax exemption in many cases is 
economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary 
 
 65 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall . . . be excluded 
from the participation in . . . activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
 66 Supra notes 57–59. 
 67 See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 559 (describing Grove City College’s decision 
to refuse state and federal financial assistance in order to avoid federal oversight). 
 68 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587–88, 591 (1983). 
 69 Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
 70 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 
Regan, 461 U.S. at 544) (Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859–60 & 859 
n.4 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (“[T]ax exemptions . . . have ‘much the same effect as [cash 
grants] . . . of the amount of tax [avoided].”). 
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subsidy[,] . . . the financial aid to religious groups is undeniable.”71 Thus, 
the fact that a private religious school holds tax-exempt status indicates that 
it participates in activities receiving federal financial assistance. And because 
these private religious schools receive federal financial assistance, the Rehab 
Act compels them to reasonably accommodate their disabled students. This 
classification of tax-exempt private religious schools reflects the federal 
government’s ability to use its taxing power to combat discrimination that 
contravenes established public policy.72 
The above analysis meshes with judicial analysis of other civil rights 
laws. The U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and Southern 
District of New York have held that tax exemptions are federal financial 
assistance for purposes of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73 The 
former court based its ruling on the premise that, as tax-exempt status is 
“available only to particular groups, it operates in fact as a subsidy in favor 
of the particular activities these groups are pursuing.”74 And the Eleventh 
Circuit has hinted that tax exemptions may be treated as federal financial 
assistance in Title IX lawsuits.75 In so doing, this court noted that “exemption 
from federal taxes produces the same result as a direct federal grant.”76 Since 
Title VI, 77  Title IX, 78  and the Rehab Act 79  incorporate identical “federal 
financial assistance” clauses, analyses of the first two statutes should apply 
with equal force to the Rehab Act. A contrary approach would ignore this 
fact to the detriment of disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose 
to pursue a religious education.80 
 
 71 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 859–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 72 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586, 604 (upholding the IRS’s decision to strip a racially 
discriminatory private religious university of its tax-exempt status because such discrimination 
contravenes congressional intent that tax-exempt institutions “serve a public purpose and not be contrary 
to established public policy”). 
 73  Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461–62 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 74 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462. 
 75 M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 802 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 76 Id. 
 77 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 78 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see M.H.D., 172 F.3d at 802 n.12 (noting that because Title VI served as a 
model for Title IX, the rationale behind regarding tax-exempt status as federal assistance should apply in 
both cases). 
 79 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 80 But see Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass’n of Ill., 134 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971–72 
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that tax exemptions are not federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes 
because the relevant regulation does not classify them as such); Bachman v. Am. Soc’y of Clinical 
Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1263–65 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that tax exemptions are not federal 
financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes as they are comparable to “economic advantage[s]” afforded 
by FCC broadcast licenses and government procurement contracts and because Rehab Act regulations 
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In addition, treating tax-exempt status as federal financial assistance in 
Rehab Act cases will also reflect the federal government’s license to use its 
taxing power to fight discrimination. The Supreme Court outlined this 
principle in its landmark Bob Jones University decision.81 There, Justice 
Warren Burger said that “entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting 
certain common law standards of charity—namely, that an institution 
seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary 
to established public policy.”82 The Supreme Court then upheld the IRS’s 
revocation of Bob Jones University’s federal tax exemption since it “would 
be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant 
the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational 
entities”83 which contravene public policy. 
Bob Jones University thus indicates that, by securing tax exemptions, 
private religious schools subject themselves to federal antidiscrimination 
policies.84 This principle applies to schools receiving tax exemptions under 
the Rehab Act.85 And such schools should therefore be required to reasonably 
accommodate disabled students. Otherwise, private religious schools will 
enjoy the benefits of federal tax exemptions while avoiding the associated 
antidiscrimination duties, such as reasonable accommodations for disabled 
students. And classifying tax exemptions as federal financial assistance for 
Rehab Act purposes is reasonable because private religious schools that truly 
do not want to comply with that statute have an easy way out—forfeiting 
their federal tax-exempt status. If a school is so inclined, it will free itself 
from any obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled students and may 
then turn away pupils who may be perceived as too difficult or expensive to 
welcome into the school community. 
Defining tax exemptions as federal financial assistance for Rehab Act 
purposes is a key first step in securing disabled students’ First Amendment 
right to choose to enroll in their preferred private religious schools. This 
 
omit tax exemptions from the definition of federal financial assistance). Because the Supreme Court has 
indicated that “tax exemptions . . . have ‘much the same effect as cash grants of the amount of tax 
avoided,’” these district court rulings may not accurately reflect how other courts will analyze the issue 
of whether tax exemptions are federal financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes in the future. See 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666, 668 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alterations 
omitted) (explaining that whether a tax-exempt status may qualify as federal assistance is nuanced); 
accord Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859–60 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 81 See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (affirming the IRS’s decision 
to strip a racially discriminatory religious university of its federal tax-exempt status). 
 82 Id. at 586. 
 83 Id. at 595. 
 84 See id. at 604–05. 
 85 Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 114–17 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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approach to tax exemptions will help expand the Rehab Act’s scope to as 
many private religious schools as possible, especially those that largely avoid 
federal programs yet exploit tax exemptions. And these schools will be 
unable to avoid their charitable and nondiscrimination duties to reasonably 
accommodate disabled students, as any failure to do so could cost a school 
its federal tax-exempt status. This analysis makes sense because federal tax 
exemptions exist to facilitate essential public benefits including reasonable 
accommodations for disabled students.86 
2. Federal Financial Assistance for Parent Entities 
Tax exemptions are only one part of the Rehab Act puzzle because 
disabled students may attend private religious schools that avoid federal 
programs and do not themselves hold tax-exempt status. But such schools 
are not necessarily immune to the Rehab Act because they may possibly have 
parent entities that should be part of the Rehab Act analysis. For example, 
the Kamehameha Schools discussed earlier in this Essay are wholly owned 
and controlled by a separate entity called the Bishop Trust, which engages 
in a variety of activities throughout Hawai’i.87 In these cases, courts should 
identify the school’s entire corporate structure, then ask whether any of its 
parent entities obtain federal financial assistance via government programs 
or tax exemptions, as the Middle District of Florida did in Schwarz v. The 
Villages Charter School.88 This approach would mirror the rule requiring 
parties seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction for LLCs to allege the 
citizenship of each member of every LLC implicated.89 And such an inquiry 
is appropriate here because, much like LLC citizenship, the characteristics 
of schools controlled by parent entities may be best defined by reference to 
their parent entities. If a school’s parent entities receive federal financial 
assistance, the school itself should be required to reasonably accommodate 
disabled students under the Rehab Act.90 
This parent entity-centric inquiry makes intuitive sense. The financial 
assistance that a private religious school’s parent entities derive from federal 
programs or tax-exempt status will naturally cascade down to the school,91 
 
 86 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591. 
 87 EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Est., 990 F.2d 458, 461–63 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 88 See Schwarz v. Villages Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1189, 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2016) 
(stating that a Rehab Act claim brought against a charter school survived summary judgment because 
although that school did not receive federal financial assistance, one of its parent entities did, and this 
support could be imputed to the charter school). 
 89 See Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 978 F.3d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 90 See Schwarz, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 1202. 
 91  See IRS, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBN9-N89H] (explaining that a parent 
religious entity’s tax-exempt status automatically extends to all subsidiaries listed with the IRS). 
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thus making the school an indirect recipient of federal financial assistance 
subject to the Rehab Act.92 Rehab Act jurisprudence should reflect this key 
aspect of multi-layered corporate structures. Otherwise, a private religious 
school could evade the Rehab Act by funneling federal financial assistance 
through a parent entity, thereby precluding disabled students from using the 
Rehab Act to secure reasonable accommodations. 
Religious interest groups will likely oppose the use of this “piercing the 
corporate veil”-style test93 when private religious schools do not reasonably 
accommodate a disabled student.94 They will probably cite the rule that the 
Rehab Act does not extend to entities that do not directly or indirectly receive 
federal financial assistance but merely derive downstream economic benefits 
from such funds95—an example of such an entity could be a third-party 
cafeteria contractor hired by a private religious school that participates in the 
free or reduced-cost school lunch program. These religious interest groups 
may then argue that private religious schools that forego federal programs 
and tax exemptions—but have otherwise inclined parent entities—should 
benefit from this “mere economic beneficiary” limitation on the scope of the 
Rehab Act. But this reasoning is flawed, as the members of any parent-
subsidiary relationship, regardless of the level of control involved, naturally 
pursue shared objectives and behave in a mutually beneficial manner, so their 
finances should be jointly assessed for Rehab Act purposes.96 Accordingly, 
any federal financial assistance received by private religious schools’ parent 
 
 92 See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1984) (explaining that schools that receive 
“indirect” federal financial assistance are nevertheless “recipients” thereof); U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986) (explaining that entities that receive federal aid via 
intermediaries are indirect federal financial assistance recipients). 
 93 The “corporate veil” refers to the fact that formation of a corporation, LLC, or other like entity 
shields its shareholders or owners from liability for debts held, and wrongs committed, by the corporate 
entity. At any rate: 
[T]here is [a] . . . fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary 
relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil [i.e., liability shield] may be pierced and 
the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form 
would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the 
shareholder’s behalf. 
United States. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998). 
 94 See Dingle, supra note 8. 
 95 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999). 
 96 Proceedings Fourth Annual International Business Law Symposium: Multinational Corporations 
and Cross Border Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing, and Successor Liability, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221, 
256 (1995) (“The parent and the subsidiary collectively are the business; they collectively conduct the 
business under the control of the parent.”); accord Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 
2001)) (“A parent corporation may be directly involved in financing and macro-management of its 
subsidiaries . . . .”). 
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entities should be imputed to the schools themselves when courts ascertain 
the schools’ Rehab Act obligations.97 
3. The Problem of Unjust School Cost-Shifting to Families 
The Rehab Act’s effectiveness also turns on who pays for disabled 
students’ reasonable accommodations. According to a Rehab Act regulation, 
all private religious schools can charge disabled students more if reasonable 
accommodations result in “substantial increases in cost” for the school.98 By 
its terms, this regulation allows private religious schools that are so inclined 
to pass the cost of reasonable accommodations to disabled students. And 
lawyers for private religious schools have hinted at a preference that families 
bear at least some of the cost of reasonable disability accommodations.99 
Such an inclination toward cost-shifting risks placing the First Amendment 
right to choose a religious education beyond the financial reach of many 
disabled students. The $114,000 in loans that Michael Argenyi took out to 
subsidize reasonable accommodations for two years of medical school aptly 
illustrate this point.100 
Since the cost of reasonable accommodations may cause sticker shock, 
private religious schools may insist the “substantial increases in cost” test 
turns on the raw dollar value of such accommodations. But, in the interest of 
maximizing disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose a religious 
education, this narrow conceptualization of “substantial increases in cost” 
should be rejected in favor of a proposed proportionality test that evaluates 
the relative effect of reasonable accommodations on a private religious 
school’s assets. The first step in this proposed test would be to examine a 
private religious school’s latest publicly available IRS Form 990,101 or the 
applicable equivalent, to ascertain its annual cash surplus, or the difference 
between revenue and expenses for that year.102 The second step in this test 
would be to divide the raw dollar value of a disabled student’s reasonable 
 
 97 Cf. Cnty. of Genesee v. Greenstone Farm Credit Servs., ACA, 968 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863–67 (E.D. 
Mich. 2013) (explaining that any tax status held by a parent or subsidiary entity can be imputed to any 
relevant related entities for purposes of obligations under federal law). 
 98 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020). 
 99 See Liekweg, supra note 55, at 100. Here, a lawyer who represented the interests of private 
Catholic schools stated that the Rehab Act likely requires “accommodating parentally-compensated sign 
interpreters for students with hearing deficiencies.” Id. (emphasis added). This remark aptly illustrates 
the fact that some private religious schools might seek reimbursement for reasonable accommodations. 
 100 Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 101 See generally Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2020), 
IRS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990 [https://perma.cc/27E2-MW84] (explaining the 
purpose of Form 990). 
 102 All tax-exempt organizations must file annual Form 990 returns. Annual Filing and Forms, IRS 
(2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-filing-and-forms [https://perma.cc/C9UL-X6
XC]. 
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accommodations by the private religious school’s annual cash surplus. The 
resulting percentage would indicate whether the private religious school can 
afford the reasonable accommodations at issue.103 
This proportionality test could also be easily adjusted in cases where a 
private religious school’s latest IRS Form 990 is not reflective of its actual 
ability to afford reasonable accommodations for its disabled students. A 
school could bring in little to no revenue, or sustain losses, but hold 
substantial liquid assets, like cash and stock in publicly traded companies.104 
Courts could respond by basing the reasonable accommodation affordability 
calculation on the amount of liquid assets listed on the school’s Form 990. 
A school could also incur an unusually high amount of expenses in a given 
year. Under such circumstances, courts could simply perform the reasonable 
accommodation affordability calculation for each year within a three-to-five-
year range. This multi-year range would help draw a more accurate picture 
of a private religious school’s finances and therefore make it more difficult 
to circumvent the proportionality test by manipulating one year of their 
finances. Courts could then aggregate the results to ascertain whether the 
school can actually afford to accommodate a disabled student. The inherent 
flexibility of this test will help prevent private religious schools that are so 
inclined from manipulating their finances in a way that enables them to avoid 
funding accommodations. And this test would also prevent affluent schools 
from unjustly shifting costs to students with disabilities while also protecting 
their less wealthy peers whose economic survival might be threatened by 
expenses related to reasonable accommodation. 
In promulgating the regulation that allows private schools to charge 
disabled students for their reasonable accommodations, the Department of 
Education could have set a fixed cost threshold for reimbursement. It instead 
opted for flexible “substantial increase in cost” language.105 This phrasing 
strongly implies that private religious schools’ obligation to fund reasonable 
accommodations is a contextual inquiry in which the costs of any such 
accommodations are evaluated in light of the school’s wealth and the money 
the government contributes to the school through tax exemptions. To this 
point, reasonable accommodations cause “substantial increases in cost” only 
if the potential expenditures, measured as a percentage of the private 
 
 103  See Schwarz v. Villages Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 2016) 
(exploring the idea of weighing the relative cost of reasonable accommodations “in light of the overall 
financial position of the covered entity”). 
 104 Liquid assets consist of cash and property, such as shares in publicly traded companies, that can 
readily be converted to cash with little to no loss in value. See James Chen, Liquid Asset, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidasset.asp [https://perma.cc/7ZVS-TYXH]. 
 105 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020). 
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religious school’s cash surplus or its other relevant assets, are so high that 
the school might be willing to abandon its tax-exempt status to avoid paying 
for the accommodations at issue. And this proportionality test would strike 
the appropriate balance between disabled students’ First Amendment right 
to choose a religious education and the economic health of private religious 
schools that offer such instruction. 
Real-world application of the proportionality test is instructive. Michael 
Argenyi provides a useful test case as the approximate cost of his cued 
speech interpreter and CART services—$57,000 per year—is known.106 This 
cost can be reconciled against the 2017 IRS Form 990s filed by four private 
religious schools in various financial situations. First, Covenant Academy in 
Cypress, Texas reported an annual loss of $108,391 in 2017.107 As a result, 
$57,000 in reasonable accommodations could be a “substantial increase in 
cost” since these expenses would cause Covenant to lose even more money. 
Second, consider Legacy Preparatory Christian Academy in The Woodlands, 
Texas, which reported a $48,599 annual cash surplus in 2017.108 Because 
$57,000 in reasonable accommodation costs would absorb Legacy Prep’s 
entire 2017 annual cash surplus and cause it to lose some money that year, a 
“substantial increase in cost” could exist here. Third, the Providence 
Christian School of Texas in North Dallas reported an annual cash surplus 
of $926,113 in 2017.109 Since $57,000 in reasonable accommodations would 
consume a mere 6.15% of Providence’s 2017 annual cash surplus, leaving it 
$869,113 for other uses, it is likely that no “substantial increase in cost” to 
the school would result. Fourth, Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska 
disclosed a $91,130,471 annual cash surplus in 2017.110 The fact that $57,000 
in reasonable accommodations would take up a tiny 0.06% of Creighton’s 
2017 annual cash surplus, leaving over $91 million intact, establishes that no 
“substantial increase in cost” would exist here. 
The above discussion raises several points. Initially, funding reasonable 
accommodations is not necessarily an all-or-nothing proposition. Disabled 
 
 106 Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 107 See Covenant Acad., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, IRS (2017), 
https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/300152850_201806_990_2019060416376611.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7PWS-SDAA]. 
 108 See Legacy Preparatory Christian Acad., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax, IRS (2017), https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/202693047_201806_990_2019051616309382
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLA4-7XKY]. 
 109 See Providence Christian Sch. of Tex., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax, IRS (2017), https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/752247092_201805_990_2019030816158492
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4ES-RBZN]. 
 110 See Creighton Univ., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, IRS (2017), 
https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/470376583_201806_990_2019060716394992.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/26WZ-SKRG]. 
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students can execute cost-sharing agreements with their private religious 
schools, which should seek reimbursement only to the extent that a student’s 
reasonable accommodations truly impose “substantial increases in cost” on 
the school. This is a contextual test that reconciles expenses for reasonable 
accommodations against the funds the federal government contributes to a 
private religious school through tax exemptions and the school’s wealth,111 
which makes sense because tax exemptions are meant to facilitate essential 
public benefits112 such as reasonable accommodations for disabled students. 
And that limitation on reimbursement for reasonable accommodations will 
protect disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose to attend the 
private religious school of their choice by eliminating potential financial 
barriers to enrollment. 
C. First Amendment Grounds for Extending the Rehab Act 
Private religious schools will likely oppose defining tax-exempt status 
and the government aid received by their parent entities as “federal financial 
assistance” in Rehab Act contexts. The proportionality test for “substantial 
increases in cost” will probably face similar resistance. Here, private 
religious schools will likely recycle their arguments against the ADA and 
claim that the application of the Rehab Act infringes on their First 
Amendment right to freely exercise their religion.113 But this reasoning is 
problematic for several reasons. First, subjecting tax-exempt private 
religious schools114 to the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation mandate 
is not a violation of the First Amendment. This is a neutral and generally 
applicable interpretation of the law that will not burden religion in advancing 
a vital government interest in the least restrictive way possible. Second, 
arguments based on the quasi-First Amendment academic freedom doctrine 
will fail as its relevant aspects deal with unrelated pedagogical concerns. 
Third, requiring tax-exempt private religious schools to adhere to the Rehab 
Act will protect disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose a 
 
 111 Whether accommodations are “undue hardships” under the Rehab Act is also a fact-specific 
question that turns on the circumstances of each case. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 
131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “undue hardship” does not require that employers “be driven to 
the brink of insolvency” but calls for a cost–benefit analysis). 
 112 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (illustrating that tax exemptions can 
be used to further federal objectives such as elimination of racial discrimination). 
 113 See Dingle, supra note 8; accord Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171, 186–90 (2012) (illustrating that the ministerial exception which allows private religious 
schools to sidestep the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions is rooted in arguments centered on 
such schools’ ability to freely exercise their religion). 
 114 For purposes of this Section, the “tax-exempt private religious schools” term includes schools 
whose parent entities receive federal financial assistance, as this Essay argues that these funds should be 
imputed to the private religious school for Rehab Act purposes. 
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religious education by increasing access to accommodations at private 
religious schools. Fourth, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA)115 does not foreclose this expansive application of the Rehab Act. 
1. Religious Schools and Their First Amendment Rights 
Neutral and generally applicable interpretations of federal laws, such as 
subjecting tax-exempt private religious schools to the Rehab Act and its 
reasonable accommodation rule, do not offend the Free Exercise Clause. 
Statutes and related doctrines are neutral and generally applicable unless they 
restrict practices because they are driven by religion or otherwise treat 
sectarian groups worse than secular equivalents. 116 This issue requires both 
facial and as-applied analyses.117 The Rehab Act is a facially neutral law as 
it does not contain any language that could be read as targeting religion.118 
And there is nothing inherently religious about requiring all recipients of 
federal financial assistance, including tax-exempt private religious schools, 
to reasonably accommodate disabled students. Also, it cannot be argued that 
extending the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation mandate to tax-
exempt private religious schools will treat sectarian schools worse than their 
secular counterparts. If anything, this use of the Rehab Act will impose upon 
private religious and secular schools an identical obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodations for their disabled students. Thus, the First 
Amendment permits extension of the neutral and generally applicable Rehab 
Act to tax-exempt private religious schools. 
Besides, subjecting tax-exempt private religious schools to the Rehab 
Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate will not burden religion in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Religion is burdened when one must 
choose between following religious doctrine and securing federal benefits.119 
Under the Rehab Act, tax-exempt private religious schools will only need to 
decide whether to reasonably accommodate their disabled students or pay 
taxes, and these options do not endanger religious precepts in violation of 
 
 115 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
 116 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–33 (1993). 
 117 Id. at 533–35; see also Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) 
(granting injunctive relief to a church from COVID-19 regulations because they “single out houses of 
worship”). 
 118 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b; cf. Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533–35 (disapproving of an ordinance’s 
use of words relevant to Santeria that targeted that particular religion). 
 119 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–24 (2017) 
(quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)) (alterations and emphasis in 
original) (“‘To condition the availability of benefits . . . upon [a recipient’s] willingness to . . . surrender[] 
his religiously impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.’ . . . 
In this case, there is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between being a church and 
receiving a government benefit. The rule is simple: No churches need apply.”). 
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the First Amendment.120 Large-print papers, sign language interpreters, and 
handicapped-accessible buildings for disabled students will not materially 
alter religious messaging or hamper rituals like Communion. In Rehab Act 
contexts, “[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact 
on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those 
schools from observing their religious tenets.”121 Since religion will not be 
burdened, requiring all tax-exempt private religious schools to reasonably 
accommodate disabled students under the Rehab Act will not offend these 
schools’ Free Exercise Clause rights.122 
In response, private religious schools might contend that using their tax-
exempt status to subject them to the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation 
requirement would “burden” religion by decreasing the cash available for 
religious activities. It is true that a tax-exempt private religious school might 
pay for reasonable accommodations under the Rehab Act. Yet every secular 
expenditure that is incurred by a tax-exempt private religious school, such as 
the payment of minimum wage in accordance with federal law,123 necessarily 
reduces the funds that are available for its religious activities. Tax-exempt 
private religious schools’ general obligation to pay for goods and services 
does not burden religion. For the same reason, private religious schools that 
relinquish their tax-exempt status to sidestep the Rehab Act will fare no 
better if they rely on the argument that general taxation burdens religion by 
shrinking the pot of money that the school can use for religious purposes. 
The Supreme Court has expressly held that, “to the extent that imposition of 
a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money [which a 
private religious school] has to spend on its religious activities, any such 
burden is not constitutionally significant.”124 
Further, to the extent that requiring tax-exempt private religious schools 
to reasonably accommodate disabled students burdens religion, any such 
burden will help advance the federal government’s compelling interest in 
ending ableism by the least restrictive means possible.125 “[D]isabilities do 
 
 120 Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24–25 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that a 
church’s choice between lobbying or paying taxes did not burden religion as that choice was not 
inherently religious). 
 121 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983). 
 122 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (explaining that a law that burdens religion 
forces religious people to choose between their religion and something like employment). 
 123 See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1401 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
private church-operated schools are subject to the minimum wage requirements set out in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and affirming an award of back pay). 
 124 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990). 
 125 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) 
(explaining that any law that is not neutral or generally applicable must be justified by a “compelling 
governmental interest”). 
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not diminish the right to full inclusion in American society.”126 The ADA and 
Rehab Act are congressional mandates to eliminate discrimination against 
individuals with a mental or physical disability.127 Both statutes safeguard 
the fundamental right of disabled persons to fully participate in modern 
society, and “target the same ‘critical areas’ where discrimination persists, 
including education.”128 And the ADA and Rehab Act both address ableism 
in education by requiring schools to reasonably accommodate disabled 
students. 129  These statutes clarify that Congress views the prevention of 
discrimination against disabled students via reasonable accommodations as 
a compelling government interest.130  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that tying tax exemptions for private religious schools to nonreligious 
federal civil rights initiatives is the least restrictive way to further the 
government interest in terminating discrimination that contravenes public 
policy.131 Any burden that may be imposed by requiring private religious 
schools to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students will 
therefore be justified by the federal government’s compelling interest to 
eradicate ableism in educational contexts. 
2. Religious Schools and Academic Freedom 
The First Amendment also implicates academic freedom, which 
encompasses “‘the four essential freedoms’ of a [school]—to determine for 
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall 
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”132 Some tax-exempt private 
religious schools might take the position that the Rehab Act’s reasonable 
accommodation rule will infringe upon their academic freedom by dictating 
how students are taught and altering the composition of their student body to 
include more disabled pupils. 
A hypothetical “how it shall be taught” academic freedom argument 
against application of the Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation 
requirement to tax-exempt private religious schools has its flaws. The “how 
it shall be taught” aspect of academic freedom encompasses a school’s right 
 
 126 Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 116 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 127 Id. at 115. 
 128 Id. at 116. 
 129 Id. at 116–17. 
 130 Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2392 
(2020) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (“We can answer the compelling interest question 
simply by asking whether Congress has treated [the interest at stake] . . . as a compelling interest.”). 
 131 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (noting that denial of federal tax 
benefits was the least restrictive means of achieving the key government interest in erasing educational 
racism). 
 132 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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to decide the substantive content of its instructional materials,133 set uniform 
class grading policies,134  and manage other curriculum-related matters.135 
These purely pedagogical concerns are unaffected by neutral and generally 
applicable laws, such as the Rehab Act, that do not impact school curricula. 
Besides, a private religious school’s autonomy in academic curriculum 
matters would not be constrained by an independent obligation to reasonably 
accommodate disabled students. 
Likewise, a possible “who may be admitted to study” academic freedom 
argument against extending the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation 
requirement to all tax-exempt private religious schools is inapplicable in this 
case. This element of academic freedom is immaterial because it pertains to 
the admissions process, as opposed to postadmission responsibilities.136 If 
anything, this “who may be admitted to study” academic freedom analysis is 
in tension with a Rehab Act regulation that bars private schools from denying 
students admission on the basis of a disability.137 
To the above point, academic freedom is constrained by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Academic freedom thus allows schools to admit students based 
on race to promote racial diversity138 but does not operate in a manner that 
allows admissions preferences designed to achieve other objectives such as 
exclusion of disabled students based on the perceived cost of their reasonable 
accommodations. And no court has decided that schools can use academic-
freedom doctrine to discriminate against their disabled applicants. For these 
reasons, tax-exempt private religious schools cannot use academic freedom 
to sidestep the Rehab Act’s substantive requirements by disfavoring disabled 
 
 133 Asociación de Educación Privada de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. García-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (explaining that academic freedom precludes laws restricting a school’s ability to choose its 
textbooks). 
 134 Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Because grading is pedagogic, the assignment 
of the grade is subsumed under the university’s freedom to determine how a course is to be taught.”). 
 135  Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 237 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) 
(quoting Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371–72 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (“The 
curricular choices of the schools should be presumptively their own . . . .”); Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 
423 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The freedom of a university to decide what may be taught and how 
it shall be taught would be meaningless” if lecturers could ignore such decrees). 
 136  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324–25 (2003); see also id. at 363 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (explaining that the “who may 
be admitted to study” part of academic freedom undergirds affirmative action programs that factor race 
into admissions). 
 137 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (2020). 
 138 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25; accord Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950) (holding 
that discrimination in the form of exclusionary educational practices that reduce racial diversity is an 
Equal Protection Clause violation); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 
(1950); Brown v. Trustees of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying this logic to gender 
discrimination). 
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applicants (and their potentially expensive reasonable accommodations) in 
the admissions process. 
3. Disabled Students and Their First Amendment Rights 
Applying the Rehab Act to tax-exempt private religious schools would 
help disabled students enjoy their First Amendment right to choose religious 
education. Disabilities do not limit constitutional rights, and handicapped 
individuals are thus entitled to complete inclusion in society.139 This right to 
full participation in society encompasses the right to choose to attend private 
religious schools, which are the only realistic means of enjoying one’s Free 
Exercise Clause right to sectarian instruction.140 Extending the Rehab Act to 
tax-exempt private religious schools will make it easier for disabled students 
to exercise their First Amendment right to choose a sectarian education by 
improving the availability of reasonable accommodations at such schools. 
Disabled students will otherwise have less access to religious instruction than 
their nonhandicapped peers, thus perpetuating a state of affairs in which 
disabled students can exercise their First Amendment rights to a lesser extent 
than nondisabled pupils. And placing tax-exempt private religious schools 
beyond the reach of the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule may 
improperly allow schools’ economic interests to constrain disabled students’ 
First Amendment rights. 
4. Support from RFRA 
Lastly, tax-exempt private religious schools may make an argument that 
RFRA shields them from the Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation 
requirement. By its terms, RFRA applies to all federal statutory and common 
law, and the implementation of that law.141 It implicates the First Amendment 
in the sense that it specifies that neutral and generally applicable federal laws 
may not burden religion unless doing so will advance some compelling 
governmental interest by the least restrictive means available.142 Schools that 
seek protection under RFRA must establish that the federal law at issue 
materially interferes with the free exercise of religion.143 If so, the opposing 
party, such as a disabled student seeking accommodations, must show that 
 
 139 Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 116 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 140 Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 42–44 (1st Cir. 2020) (illustrating that because the 
state of Maine requires its public schools to use a nonreligious curriculum, private schools are the only 
means through which students in that state may receive a religious education during elementary and 
secondary school). 
 141 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a); see also Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 492 (2020) (clarifying that 
the federal government is subject to RFRA, which does not extend to the states). 
 142 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 143 Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Weir v. Nix, 
114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
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the relevant burden on religion furthers a fundamental government interest 
by the least restrictive method possible.144 
A RFRA challenge to an interpretation of the Rehab Act which obliges 
tax-exempt private religious schools to reasonably accommodate disabled 
students would initially posit that this application of the law materially 
burdens such schools’ freedom to exercise their religion. But this reasoning 
has its flaws. The Supreme Court has held that religion is not burdened when 
tax-exempt status is conditioned on acceptance of nonsectarian civil rights 
initiatives.145 As such, tax-exempt private religious schools that try to evade 
the civil rights initiatives built into the Rehab Act by invoking RFRA will 
most likely be unable to satisfy RFRA’s threshold requirement146 of material 
government interference with the free exercise of their religion. And even if 
the Rehab Act burdens religion, subjecting all tax-exempt private religious 
schools to the reasonable accommodation mandate would advance the 
compelling government interest in ending educational ableism in the least 
restrictive means possible. The government also has an “‘interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system,’ free of ‘myriad exceptions flowing from a 
wide variety of religious beliefs.’”147 Uniform application of the Rehab Act’s 
reasonable accommodation rule to all tax-exempt private schools, including 
those that are religious in nature, is the least restrictive way of furthering this 
interest in an equitable and functional tax system. 
D. Policy Considerations: Preventing Federal Entanglement in Disability 
Discrimination 
Beyond the foregoing constitutional and statutory issues, a key policy 
consideration favors extending the Rehab Act to tax-exempt private religious 
schools: avoiding federal entanglement in discrimination that contravenes 
public policy. The federal government has a compelling interest in erasing 
ableism in education contexts.148 And since tax exemptions cannot support 
discriminatory behavior,149 private religious schools should not be excused 
from the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule. Freeing tax-exempt 
private religious schools of the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule 
 
 144 Id. (citing Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 145 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). 
 146 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
 147  Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 25–26 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699–700 
(1989)). 
 148 Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 115–17 (3d Cir. 2018) (analyzing 
the ADA and Rehab Act and stating that they address longstanding issues arising from open 
discrimination against disabled persons). 
 149 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595 (explaining that federal tax exemptions cannot support 
racially discriminatory schools or entities). 
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would turn the federal government into an indirect supporter, through tax 
exemptions, of the disability discrimination that Congress tried to reduce by 
enacting that statute.150 
IV. AMENDING THE ADA AND THE REHAB ACT 
If federal courts prove unwilling to extend the Rehab Act and its 
reasonable accommodation mandate to tax-exempt private religious schools, 
some small changes to the ADA and the Rehab Act will help ensure that such 
schools reasonably accommodate their disabled students. First, as discussed 
in this Essay, Congress should augment the Rehab Act by recognizing tax-
exempt status as federal financial assistance, imputing federal financial 
assistance received by the parent entities of private religious schools to such 
schools, and adopting the proportionality ability-to-pay test for identification 
of “substantial increases in cost” that enable schools to seek reimbursement 
for reasonable accommodations from their disabled students. Second, 
Congress should pass another Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act-style bill that remedies gaps in current ADA jurisprudence.151 This new 
amendment would repeal the religious exemption enumerated in Title III of 
the ADA on grounds that, as shown above, a legal obligation to reasonably 
accommodate disabled students will not burden religion. And Free Exercise 
Clause arguments against Title III of the ADA may indeed be motivated not 
by religious concerns but by sectarian schools’ reluctance to fund reasonable 
accommodations for the disabled.152 Such selective tightening of religious 
schools’ purse strings is not a valid basis for immunity from ADA Title III 
and its reasonable accommodation mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
The religious exemption codified in Title III of the ADA gives some 
private religious schools the impression that they can refuse to reasonably 
accommodate their disabled students, and some of these schools do adopt 
 
 150 See Berardelli, 900 F.3d at 115–17. 
 151 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also Arlene 
S. Kanter, Religious Freedom Is No Reason to Deny People with Disabilities the Right to Equality in the 
Workplace, HILL (July 26, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/509032-religious-
freedom-is-no-reason-to-deny-people-with-disabilities-the-right [https://perma.cc/V8KE-HQSG] 
(arguing for legislative action by Congress to correct the Biel court’s interpretation of Title I’s religious 
ministerial exception). 
 152 Dingle, supra note 8; Adam Emerson, Religious Schools, the ADA, and the Justice Department, 
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. (May 16, 2013), https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/commentary/religious-
schools-ada-and-justice-department [https://perma.cc/7LFP-4BC9] (illustrating that the Association of 
Christian Schools International opposed the ADA in its original form because it would require churches 
to spend money on accessibility for the disabled). 
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such an approach to handicapped pupils.153 Such unwillingness to provide 
reasonable accommodations may force disabled students to locate a more 
welcoming educational environment elsewhere.154 Thus, disabled students 
cannot enjoy their Free Exercise Clause right to seek a religious education to 
the same extent as their nonhandicapped peers. This state of affairs must 
change; individuals do not lose their constitutional rights just because they 
happen to have a disability. 
The solution to this problem may be fairly simple. Subjecting private 
religious schools that either hold tax-exempt status or have parent entities 
that receive federal financial assistance to the Rehab Act will substantially 
improve disabled students’ access to reasonable accommodations at such 
schools.155 Disabled students will gain further protection from discrimination 
if tax-exempt private religious schools’ right to seek reimbursement for 
reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Rehab Act turns on the school’s 
inability to afford such modifications. This expansive interpretation of the 
Rehab Act will substantially safeguard disabled students’ constitutional right 
to choose to attend the private religious school of their choice without either 
infringing on these schools’ First Amendment rights to freely exercise their 
religion or running afoul of RFRA. 
 
 153  See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(indicating that a private Quaker school’s refusal to accommodate a student’s disabilities contributed to 
the student leaving the school). 
 154 See, e.g., Spann ex rel. Hopkins v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr. Church, 589 F. Supp. 2d 759, 762 
(S.D. Miss. 2008) (outlining a scenario where an autistic student was not permitted to reenroll in the 
church preschool of his choice). 
 155 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). 
